This paper critically examines Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in an insolvency context. The paper is divided into three parts. First, we examine the area of CSR generally. Secondly, we consider directors' obligations to creditors in both a solvent and insolvent context. Thirdly, we examine directors continuing obligations to stakeholders during a formal insolvency process. This three-pronged analysis allows us to consider whether directors still owe CSR type obligations whilst a company is going through a formal insolvency procedure pursuant to English and Welsh law. It is this crossover between CSR and insolvency which is examined in part three of the paper. It is argued that directors continue to owe duties to creditors during an insolvency procedure but that they may also continue to have obligations towards wider stakeholders, including those that fall under the realm of CSR. It is argued that this continuing CSR responsibility evidences how ingrained CSR concepts now are in English and Welsh law.
Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has for some time been recognised as a key component of English and Welsh corporate law and practice. Drawing on international approaches 1 the concept is now to some extent reflected in English and Welsh law. 2 Similarly, directors' continuing obligations to various stakeholders, both in a solvent environment and whilst a company is going through a formal insolvency process, also have a fairly long heritage. 3 This paper examines the concepts of CSR and insolvency against the backdrop of the recent global "credit crunch." 4 The paper is divided into three parts. First, we examine the area of CSR generally. Secondly, we consider directors' obligations to creditors in both a solvent and insolvent context.
Thirdly, we examine directors continuing obligations to stakeholders during a formal insolvency process. This three-pronged analysis allows us to consider whether directors still owe CSR type obligations whilst a company is going through a formal insolvency procedure pursuant to English and Welsh law. It is this cross-over between CSR and insolvency which is examined in part three of this paper. It is argued that directors continue to owe duties to creditors during an insolvency
procedure, but that they may also continue to have obligations towards wider stakeholders, including those that fall under the realm of CSR. It is argued that this continuing responsibility evidences how ingrained CSR concepts now are in English and Welsh law.
Corporate Social Responsibility
CSR is a very broad subject by its nature, ranging from community relations to sustainable development. It is important, under the principles of CSR, to conduct the business of a company in an economically, socially and environmentally responsible manner. CSR is a "concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis." 5 More often, its meaning is expressed in "moralistic catchwords", as well as basic definition statements such as "human dignity, equality, and the social good", although these definitions might themselves be unclear and subjective. give them a more favourable investment environment, hoping to encourage further local investment and to settle more local social problems. The employees will also trust the company and be willing to work there because of its respected local reputation.
If we view this problem in a broader sense, CSR is also helpful to companies' performance in achieving their social objectives based on participatory social policies. 22 Carroll has suggested that one way of assessing the social performance of companies is to measure the social objectives they implement. 23 Social audit systems and financial accounting procedures are two means of assessing corporate social performance. 24 Specifically, they m easure the social performance of a company, including employment opportunity programs, conditions of work in the workplace, pollution control, job satisfaction and the quality of working life, the ethical performance of corporate executives and community and urban redevelopment programmes. 25 Local government makes frequent assessments of corporate social performance in order to promote and monitor the status of directors' duties in term of their CSRs. Meanwhile, the media and other related organisations will regularly publish the results of such assessments, which can have a significant impact on the reputation and development of the company.
CSR, which is still often of a v oluntary nature, largely parallels the concept of "stakeholder theory", which emphasises the intertwined relationship between enterprise and individuals and organisations larger than the ones traditionally accounted for by businesses and professionals
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. CSR is able justify its existence since it has successfully proven how social and environmental corporate engagement can substantially benefit society and the enterprise itself. 27 The adoption of stakeholder theory seems to be a logical step towards the development of more ethical corporations.
It is against this backdrop of CSR imbued directorial behaviour that we can now consider the directors' relationship with creditors generally.
The Nature and Scope of Directors' Duties towards Creditors
Since the judicial acceptance of the company as a separate legal entity 28 it is a clearly established rule that directors must exercise the power given by company law as fiduciaries for the company as a whole without negligence 29 Before we move to that question we will now consider the nature of directors' duties to creditors; before going on to discuss the extent of the duties; finally we will examine some areas for legislative reform in this area.
The nature of the Duties Owed by Directors to their Company's Creditors

General Nature
Directors have various duties that fall within the scope of two main areas. If there is a duty owed by directors to creditors, a question arises on the nature of the duty -namely -is the duty a direct duty or a duty mediated through the company?
That is to say a clear distinction has to be drawn between saying that a director owes a fiduciary duty to a creditor, and saying that a director has a duty to consider the interests of creditors. 69 The rationale of shit of duties from shareholders to creditors is described as 'creditors maximisation' and 'true shit' b y American Scholars comparing with 'entity maximisation' a nd 'shareholders maximisation'. The classification is generated by a famous footnote from Chancellor Allen who set standard in organising structure for any efficiency analysis in the corporate distress context 70 E.g. This idea is also held by Professor Jonathan C. Lipson when he said that "once a corporation is in financial distress, duties of care and loyalty that ordinarily run solely to or for the benefit of shareholders 'shift' to corporate creditors" 77 . The reason of shifting is when the company is insolvent, near insolvent or embarking on a venture the directors and shareholder have nothing to lose and the interests of the company are fully subject to the interest of the creditors. 78 At this moment, the shareholders' ownership on residual value of the company is supplanted by the creditors (whose rights are turned into equity-like rights) 79 and the creditors may be regarded as the major stakeholders in the company. 
Redistributive Duty?
When discussing directors' duties to creditors a comparison should always be made between the position of the beneficiaries of the directors' duties before and after the debtor firm becomes subject to a distinct insolvency regime. This exercise should be undertaken in order to judge if the directors' duty is in some way redistributive. It has been argued by Professor Riz Mokal that the duties "are redistibutive if they give to those whose interests they serve a claim again assets they would not have under the general law" 81 . The directors' duty discussed here are resditributive according to this norm since the position of the creditors are distinct before and after the duties owed by the directors step in. 82 After the duty is triggered, the creditors are enjoying a fresh kind of right to bring a claim in relation to assets of directors which they would not have under general law. 83 The redistribution of the duty imposes the personal liability on the directors if they make any wrongful decisions that lead to further loss to their company's creditors.
Since the redistributive nature of the duties owed by the directors to the creditors makes the directors responsible for the creditors independently and individually, the advantage of this kind of duty for the creditors is there is a chance that some money can be compensated from the directors if the company ends up in insolvent liquidation. 84 The directors of the company, if the company is financially distressed, will use their discretion in favour of the creditors threatened by the legal proceedings in the future. 85 The disadvantage is, in our view, that the directors have to again use their discretion to decide when the duty triggers, which is difficult to judge. 86 The directors, while explicitly aware that they might be held responsible for the debt with their belongings, will find themselves overindulged with the concerns of their liabilities to the creditors to the extent of overlooking the interests of shareholders even while the company is solvent. 
Rationale for the Duty
We can argue, from another angle, that the duty owed by directors to creditors is a form of creditor protection to ensure that the creditors will get their money back when the company gets into financial difficulties. If the creditors are not properly protected, it will result in systemic trouble in the financial system due to certain kind of chain reaction. 88 What is more, the company owes a duty to its creditors to keep its . Therefore the directors should, at this moment, do their best with their skills, experiences, and knowledge to "externalise the cost of the company's debt".
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It was argued that "creditors could suffer harm where the company unilaterally increased the risk" 93 and the greatest protection will be provided from the duty of the directors at the time of greatest risk 94 . The board of the company should try to prevent the "profligate use of corporate power to incur liabilities.
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" In reality, it is one of creditors' bearing risks which creditors have not agreed to take on transferring from the shareholders. 96 Therefore, it will be unreasonable for the creditors to be liable for the risks and directors should step in on behalf of the company to protect the creditors.
Ex Post Nature
Unlike the contractual duties owed the buyer and seller in sale of goods contract, the directors' duties in relation to creditors are provided in an ex post nature. That means since creditors are seldom required to sign up to certain terms in the creditor contract it might be unfair for the directors to be held liable for the actions that they 101 But the uncertainty of this kind of responsibility will definitely cause many uncertain aspects in enforcing the law as the directors will constantly get confused and have too much discretion, which he or she might not be willing to process.
Extent of the Duties Owed by Directors in Relation to their Company's Creditors
After obtaining a clear idea of the nature of the duties owed by the directors to their company's creditors, it is crucial to define the extent of the duties. Before discussing this, one should be aware that the directors would still be responsible for the company as a whole before an office-holder is appointed to fill in for the director and 
To Whom are the Directors' Duties Owed?
The traditional view of English company law denied directors' duties to third parties dealing with the company, such as its creditors. 106 But the adverse idea prevailed both in judgments 107 and academic writings 108 in commonwealth countries over the last twenty years. But there are still two questions to reconsider, i.e. whether the duty of directors is owed directly or indirectly to the creditors, and, does future creditors exists and, if it does, should they be taken into account?
Lord Templeman states in Winkworth 109 that "a company owes its duty to its creditors, present and future …" in which he suggested a duty to future creditors exists. In Meanwhile, Professor John Farrar criticised this idea by saying "they seemed to use the alter ego theory to lift the corporate veil in favor of creditors in a way which is unprecedented in Commonwealth case law". 113 Furthermore, it can be argued that future creditors could protect their own interests in deciding whether to do business with the company or not, a choice clearly denied to existing creditors. It can also be argued that it is indeed very difficult for the directors to look after the interests of the "future" or "potential" creditors because it would be a very hard job for them to identify and predict who will be "future" or "potential" creditors as the precondition of protecting their interests. The similar idea is shared by other leading cases 144 which confirm the directors' duties to creditors when the company is in doubtful insolvency.
Fullham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates plc
Although it is explicitly states in those cases the directors have a duty on creditor when the company is nearing insolvency or in doubtful insolvent. But it would be a very tough job to define what is "nearing insolvent" or "in the vicinity to insolvent" and "doubtful insolvent" while the conception of "insolvency" itself is still a debatable notion. The directors have to judge by using his own discretion when the company is in such situations which upgrade the directors' duty 145 and they also should "take stoke of the company's position in order to ascertain whether the company will remain solvent after the action which is contemplated" 146 In
Nicholson v Permakraft
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, Cook, J commented on situation which directors should consider creditors' interests including the situation when the director's "contemplated payment or other course of action could jeopardise its insolvency"
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. That means if the directors' misfeasance put the company into risk of insolvency he will be personal liable to the creditors. But a very important point has to be made that if the directors are in good faith, the case has to be considered diversely. It will be a suggestive idea to assess the directors according to his or her knowledge and experiences in advance.
D. The Company in a position of Financial Instability
The directors maybe have to be responsible for the creditors' interests when the company is in a dangerous financial position 149 or financially unstable
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. It is agreed that these blurry phrases basically means the company is in a bad condition that could very possibly result in insolvent. But this notion is still not practical enough for enforcement for directors. And how to differ it from 'doubtful insolvency' is another issue awaiting settlement.
E. The Company which is very solvent
When the company's assets are much more than its debt, it would be difficult to impose a duty on directors in relation to creditors, as there are no outstanding creditor claims the issues of breach of such a duty simply cannot arise. 151 What is more is that the function of directors is to make judgments about business risks and to take those risks---and to drive as hard a bargain as they can when negotiating with outside parties. 152 If the directors are required to consider the interests of creditors even if the company is running smoothly it will make the directors in state of a constant-lasting panic and worry about the company too much and too early which will severely interfere his obligatory duties on shareholders.
The relationship among the companies' i nterests, companies' s ituations and directors' duties in relation to creditors can be illustrated by the following diagram
although not exactly precise in certain ways:
Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1990] 
Shareholders' Interests Creditors Interests
It would be very important for future researchers and judgers to clarify the conception of t he "insolvent", "near insolvent", "doubtful insolvent", "risk of insolvent"
and "financial instability" in order to make the extent of the duties clearer and easier to enforce. With the ascend of the risk, how directors can act 153 , with their own discretion, to protect the creditors and does the court has the role to play are also pending questions awaiting more exact and reasonable judicial and academic explanations. 153 The legal obligations for the directors when the Company goes into financial trouble should be further discussed.
Company's Interests as a Whole
Directors' Duties to Look after
Creditor Protections (one part of the duty)
Risk of the Creditors
Both of them will Increase along with the Deterioration of the Company
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The Directors' General Role in Insolvency
From the foregoing analysis it must now be accepted that directors have responsibilities to creditors. But do directors owe a duty to any other stakeholders once they have been displaced as the controlling office holders in an insolvency procedure? Before we address that issue it might first be appropriate to define the directors' role when their company is in a formal insolvency procedure. 154 There are a number of instructive cases in this regard and some continuing statutory obligations.
Directors have a number of obligations to perform, even when a company is in an insolvency procedure and, prima facie, controlled by someone else. For example, Kerr has opined that there still remains an obligation to: file accounts; file a directors report; to hold annual general meetings; to file annual returns; and, to lay copies of reports and accounts before an annual meeting. 155 In Newhart Developments Ltd v. extent been usurped by an insolvency practitioner who has taken over day to day management of the company as part of an insolvency procedure.
Co-operative Commercial Bank Ltd
Does Insolvency Displace Directors' CSR functions?
If, pursuant to the forgoing analysis, it is accepted that directors owe duties, not least to creditors, in an insolvency context, can it be said that they should continue to also owe other species of duty, such as those in the nature of CSR? Or put another way, why shouldn't directors continue to respect their CSR obligations even if a company is in an insolvency procedure? If filling accounts is still a requirement of directors when a company has entered an insolvency procedure , why shouldn't ensuring CSR type obligations are met?
Some commentators may argue that CSR functions provide an unnecessary and costly burden on companies which should be the first cost to be stripped away, in favour of the essentials, when a company goes into an insolvency procedure. Others may argue that CSR is a proper and wholly valid function of the company and its management and that the management have as much a responsibility in this regard as they do in relation to the filling of accounts. Why should CSR become any less important just because a company has gone into an insolvency procedure? If the concept is to be completely grasped and wholeheartedly imbedded in must become as second nature as filling accounts.
